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Comment
COMBATING A DIFFERENT ENEMY: PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE
CULTURE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY
"[T]he U.S. government and its military aspire to preserve the
dignity and promote the fair treatment of service members
across lines of gender and military rank, an aspiration thwarted
by the persistence of sexual exploitation and assault within
the services."-Prof. Elizabeth L. Hillman'
I. THE STARTLING TRUTH ABOUT MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT
Military members agree to sacrifice their lives for their country; yet,
United States military women are more likely to be raped by a fellow mili-
tary member than killed by enemy fire in Iraq. 2 The irony is that a
deployed female military member must find ways to protect herself not
just against the enemy, but also against her comrades-in-arms.3 Statistics
justify these fears; military sexual assault rates are twice as high as civilian
rates and the majority of the assailants in the military setting are fellow
1. Sexual Assault in the Military Part Three: Context and Causes: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'1 Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Re-
form, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Hearings 2009] (statement of Elizabeth L.
Hillman, Prof., Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law). Hillman argued that the cur-
rent military approach to preventing sex crimes is hindered, in part, because
United States military law is "dominated by legal precedents involving sexual vio-
lence and racialized images." See id. (connecting prevalence of sexual offenses to
military law). The disproportionate number of important precedent cases involv-
ing sex crimes has shaped the military legal culture by making male sexual vio-
lence and female vulnerability appear to be the norm. See id. at 5-6 (describing
how prevalence of sex crimes cases in military precedence influences military legal
culture and military justice system).
2. See Sexual Assault in the Military: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat '1 Sec. and
Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008)
(statement of Jane Harman, Cong. Rep.). Of the female veterans seen at one Vet-
erans Administration health center, forty-one percent were victims of sexual assault
and twenty-nine percent were raped, all while in the military. See id. (discussing
extent of military sexual assault and criticizing official response).
3. See HELEN BENEDICT, THE LONELY SOLDIER 167-68 (2009) (recalling stories
of deployed military women protecting themselves from rape by fellow military
members). Deployed female soldiers reportedly carried knives not for protection
against the enemy, but for protection against rape by men in their units. See id. at
168 (quoting former soldier, Mickiela Montoya, who indicated that she "wasn't
carrying the knife for the enemy, [she] was carrying it for the guys on [her] own
side").
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service members.4 Moreover, the problem is not limited to women; mili-
tary men are also victims of sexual assault.5
Compounding the already devastating consequences of sexual assault
is the unique military environment: women veterans who are sexually as-
saulted while in the military are nine times more likely to develop post-
traumatic stress disorder than military women who are not.6 On a broader
4. See Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 1-2 (statement of Helen Benedict, Prof.
ofJoumalism, Columbia Univ.) (noting that "one in six women is raped or sexu-
ally assaulted in her lifetime, according to the National Institute of Justice")
(endnote omitted); Helen Benedict, The Scandal of Military Rape, Ms., Fall 2008, at
40, 42 ("In 2007, the Department of Veterans Affairs reported that [twenty] per-
cent of female veterans seen at its facilities nationwide said they had been raped or
sexually assaulted while serving. Other veterans studies put the incidence of rape
at [thirty] percent: nearly one-third of all women in the military force."); U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FY08 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
MILITARY app. c, tbl.5 (2009), available at http://www.sapr.mil/contents/
ResourcesReports/AnnualReports/DoDFY08_AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter
FY08 REPORT] (providing military sexual assault statistics for fiscal year 2008). In
fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DoD) received 2,265 unrestricted
reports of sexual assault in the military, of which 1,158 reports (51%) were mili-
tary-on-military. See FY08 REPORT, supra, at 34(providing statistics on unrestricted
reports of military sexual assault). For the same year, the DoD received 753 re-
stricted reports of military sexual assault of which 393 reports (52%) were military-
on-military. See id. at 40, app. c., tbl.5 (providing statistics on restricted reports of
military sexual assault). These statistics represent sex crimes against adults includ-
ing "rape, aggravated assault, nonconsensual sodomy, aggravated sexual contact,
abusive sexual contact, wrongful sexual contact, and attempts to commit these of-
fenses." Id. at 33 (explaining military's sexual assault offense definition). Addi-
tionally, although military members are also sexually assaulted by non-military
civilians, this Comment is concerned only with sexual assault where both the victim
and the offender are military members. For further discussion of the differences
between restricted and unrestricted reports of military sexual assault, see infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
5. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at app. c, tbl.5 (providing statistics for mili-
tary sexual assault by victim and assailant gender). In fiscal year 2008, the DoD
received 123 unrestricted reports of sexual assaults classified as male-on-male and
fourteen classified as female-on-male. See id. (detailing statistics of unrestricted re-
ports of military sexual assault). Of the restricted reports made that same year,
eighty-three involved male victims. See id. (citing restricted reports of military sex-
ual assault statistics). Data regarding the gender of assailants in these restricted
reports is not provided.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR VicTIMs OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 32 (2004), available at http://www.sapr.mil (follow "Reports & Resources"
hyperlink; then follow "Reports" hyperlink; then "Task Force Report on Care for
Victims of Sexual Assault, April 2004" hyperlink) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT](describing impact of sexual assault on military victims); Alina Suris et al., Sexual
Assault in Women Veterans: An Examination of PTSD Risk, Health Care Utilization, and
Cost of Care, 66 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 749, 755 (2004) (finding differential impact
of military sexual assault on development of post-traumatic stress disorder). Sex-
ual assault "destabilizes a victim's sense of control, safety and well being, particu-
larly if the victim lives in the same building, is assigned within the same command,
and frequents the same base support and recreation facilities as the offender."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 32 (explaining how sexual assault uniquely affects
military victims). Additionally, "[w]ithin the military, sexual assault often involves
continued victim-assailant contact after the incident." Ann M. Vallandingham, De-
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scale, military sexual assault affects more than just the individual victim; it
also negatively impacts mission readiness and destroys the trust needed
among service members responsible for protecting each others' lives.7
Given the high demand on the military in Iraq and Afghanistan today,
preservation of military readiness is vitally important.8 Furthermore, sex-
ual assault is incompatible with the military services' core values of honor,
integrity, and respect.9 Military leaders recognize that sexual assault runs
counter to these values and insist that change is needed.10
Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) have attempted to
address military sexual assault through training, victim response, and
changes to the military's sexual offenses statute." Whether these efforts
are actually reducing the rate of military sexual assault is unclear, however,
because the number of reported sexual assaults continues to climb.12
partment of Defense's Sexual Assault Policy: Recommendations for a More Comprehensive
and Uniform Policy, 54 NAVAL L. REv. 205, 210 (2007) (explaining how traumatizing
effects of sexual assault are increased for military victims).
7. See Sexual Assault in the Military Part Two: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 6
(2008) [hereinafter Hearings Part Two 2008] (statement of Kaye Whitley, Dir., Of-
fice of the Sec'y of Def., Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Office) (stating that
military sexual assault negatively impacts victims and mission readiness); FY08 RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 7 (recognizing impact of sexual assault on military members
and mission readiness).
8. See Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Re-
build Readiness of US. Ground Forces: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Armed Services,
110th Cong. 2-3 (2008) (statement of Sharon L. Pickup, Dir., Def. Capabilities and
Mgmt., Gov't Accountability Office) (stating that mission requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan have significantly impacted military readiness).
9. See U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation § 12-501
(1996), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defenseethics/ethicsregulation
/dir550007.pdf (detailing primary ethical values DoD employees should follow in
their official duties); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (describing impor-
tance of military core values in achieving military mission).
10. See Gina Cavallaro, Outgoing Army Secretary Looks Back, ARMY TIMES, July 27,
2008, at 24 (quoting former Army Secretary Pete Geren stating, "[t]he fact that
within an organization like the Army .. . where people will die for one another just
because they wear the same uniform, how can you have a situation where soldiers
rape soldiers? It's such an outrage on the whole Army ethic."). Geren further
stated that "[iut's going to require continued emphasis from leaders at all levels to
bring about the culture change." Id. (proposing that military culture needs to
change to end military sexual assault).
11. For a discussion of the DoD and legislative response to military sexual
assault, see infra notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
12. See Helen Benedict, The Pentagon's Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the
Military, or, How to Lie with Statistics, HUvFINcTON PosT, Mar. 20, 2009, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/helen-benedict/the-pentagons-annual-repo-b_177563.
html (stating that "no one can tell if an increase in reported sexual assaults means
more assaults or more reports"); see alsoJennifer S. Knies, Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back: Wy the New UCMJ's Rape Law Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative
Consent Statute Will Put It Back on Target, ARMY LAw., Aug. 2007, at 1, 6 (arguing that
training and response will likely have limited preventative effect on military sexual
assault).
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Moreover, studies show that such "easy quick fix solutions" are unlikely to
prevent sexual assault.1 3
Researchers and commentators have discussed the response to sexual
assault victims and the prosecution rates in sexual assault cases-two ele-
ments which come into play after the crime has occurred. 14 In contrast,
this Comment addresses the source of the problem-the contemporary
United States military culture.15 Feminist legal scholars have posited that
various structural aspects of the culture subordinate military women.' 6
This Comment specifically links sexual assault to the military policies and
leaders' actions that must be changed to improve the military culture and
end sexual violence within the ranks.17
13. Moira Carmody & Kerry Carrington, Preventing Sexual Violence?, 33 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 341, 343 (2000) (explaining why popular solutions to
prevent sexual violence are ineffective). Sexual violence is difficult to prevent be-
cause it is frequently unreported and the victims often lack the social resources to
help them respond to it. See id. (describing barriers to preventing sexual vio-
lence). Additionally, intimate sexual violence, where the attacker is an acquain-
tance of the victim, "remains relatively invisible and normalised in everyday
relationships" and is not adequately addressed through standard crime prevention
strategies. See id. at 343-44 (arguing effective sexual violence prevention requires
unique approach). Finally, legislative reform has "virtually negligible preventative
value, as it represents an intervention after, not before the incident." Id. at 344
(explaining shortcomings of legislative reform efforts).
14. See Liz KELLY, Jo LovEr'r & LINDA REGAN, A GAP OR A CHASM? ArrITION IN
REPORTED RAPE CASES ix-xi (2005), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/
hors293.pdf (listing reasons for attrition in reported rape cases based on cases
withdrawn from criminal justice system); Paul Schimpf, Talk the Talk; Now Walk the
Walk: Giving an Absolute Privilege to Communications Between a Victim and Victim-Advo-
cate in the Military, 185 MIL. L. REv. 149, 151 (2005) (proposing adoption of abso-
lute privilege for communications between military sexual assault victims and
victim advocates). See also Vallandingham, supra note 6, at 224-27 (proposing des-
ignation of peer resources who are lower-ranked military members with limited
confidentiality to receive reports of sexual assault from victims).
15. See generally Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 341-42 (describing
victim care and law reform as tertiary levels of intervention that occur after sexual
assault). Efforts that address the response after a sexual assault has occurred, such
as victim care and offender prosecution, may have a preventative effect on future
sexual assault. See id. (stating tertiary intervention may "contribute to the preven-
tion of further harm or the reduction in repeat offending"). Such efforts, how-
ever, lack potential to serve as primary prevention to prevent sexual assault before
it even occurs. See id. (explaining that reform efforts aimed at post-assault activities
"do not embody a primary preventative potential").
16. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism and Institutional
Reform, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 217, 226-29 (1993) (explaining how official
military policies and informal practices support subordination of women as non-
dominant group members); Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection
Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REv. 303, 341, 348
(2005) (contending women's exclusion from combat "reflects and perpetuates
male supremacy and female subordination"). Women military members are dis-
tanced and devalued through the exclusion of women from combat, sexual harass-
ment and assault, and misogynistic rituals and jokes. See Abrams, supra, at 226-27
(describing practices that subordinate military women).
17. For a discussion of the proposed reform to current United States military
policies and leaders' actions, see infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
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Part II summarizes the history of sexual assault in the military and the
extent of the problem today.' 8 Part III discusses the military's response to
sexual assault by surveying recently instituted victim reporting options and
training programs for service members as well as recent changes to the sex
offenses statute of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ).1 9 Part IV
identifies the contemporary United States military culture as the source of
military sexual assault and critiques the official response to date as incapa-
ble of remedying this culture. 20 Part V presents three proposals that aim
to end military sexual assault by reforming current policies and addressing
actions of military leaders that influence the culture.2 ' Finally, Part VI
urges multi-pronged legal efforts to combat sexual assault in the military
through changes that will affect its culture, such as executive action to de-
marginalize women's military service, legislative action to end the combat
exclusion, and administrative action to hold commanders accountable for
implementing the sexual assault prevention and response program.22
II. RECENT HISTORY OF MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT
Military sexual violence, though a problem for many decades, has gar-
nered increased public attention over the past twenty years because of sev-
eral sex scandals.2 3 Although the military has adopted a "no tolerance"
policy toward sexual assault, statistics indicate that it still plagues the
18. For a discussion of the origins of contemporary military sexual assault and
its impact on today's United States military, see infta notes 23-51 and accompany-
ing text.
19. For an analysis of the DoD and legislative response to contemporary sex
scandals in the United States military and the revision of the statute governing
military sex offenses, as well as discussion of the debate generated by the revision,
see infra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of the contemporary United States military culture as the
source of the sexual assault problem and an evaluation of the current approach's
effectiveness in eliminating military sexual assault, see infra notes 81-118 and ac-
companying text.
21. For a discussion of the policy changes the military should implement to
reduce the conduciveness of its culture to high rates of sexual assault, see infra
notes 119-70 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of proposed legal avenues for changing the contempo-
rary United States military culture, see infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text
23. See BENEDICT, supra note 3, at 7 (noting history of military sexual vio-
lence); Schimpf, supra note 14, at 155 (recounting several military sexual assault
cases that drew national attention). Sexual violence in the military is not a new
phenomenon:
The sexual persecution of women has been going on in the armed forces
for generations, as decades of studies have revealed. A 2004 study of vet-
erans from Vietnam and all the wars since, who were seeking help for
[Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder], found that 71% of women said they
were sexually assaulted or raped while serving. And a 1995 study of fe-
male veterans of the Gulf and earlier wars found that 90% had been sexu-
ally harassed.
BENEDIct, supra note 3, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
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ranks.24 While opinions about the effectiveness of the official response to
military sexual assault vary, all concerned agree that military sexual assault
is a vastly underreported crime that needs to end.25
A. Military Sex Scandals and the Official Response
In the past twenty years, no branch of the United States military has
escaped the embarrassment and devastation of appalling sex scandals. 26
In 1991, widely reported accounts of the Tailhook Convention, the annual
aviators' convention, revealed that Navy officers engaged in excessive
drinking, debauchery, and sexual abuse.2 7 Shortly thereafter, in 1996, re-
ports surfaced about the sexual harassment and rape of female trainees by
their drill instructors at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Grounds.28 Then,
in 2003, allegations of sexual assault and reprisal against victims at the Air
Force Academy captured the attention of the national media as well as
Congress.29
24. See Memorandum from the Sec'y of Def. to Secretaries of the Military
Dep'ts et al. (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.sapr.mil/contents/SAAM/
OSD_03306-09.pdf ("The Department of Defense has a no-tolerance policy toward
sexual assault."); see also Benedict, supra note 4, at 42 (describing scope of military
sexual assault problem through reported cases, estimates of unreported cases, and
studies of female veterans).
25. Compare FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 63 (stating that DoD is committed
to ending sexual assault and interpreting increase in sexual assault reports as indi-
cation that efforts are working), with Benedict, supra note 4, at 41-42 (arguing that
DoD response has failed to adequately address military sexual assault because of
low prosecution rates, increasing reports of sexual assault, and vast underreporting
of sexual assault).
26. See generally Schimpf, supra note 14, at 155 (describing how recent military
sexual assault cases led to DoD and congressional response).
27. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supfa note 6, at 93 (providing chronology of mili-
tary and DoD response to sexual misconduct); Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Report
Tells of Aviators' "Debauchery", N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993, Sec. 1, at 1 (discussing
Pentagon report about official investigation into Tailhook scandal). The victims
included eighty-three women and seven men, who reported being "groped,
pinched and fondled on their breasts, buttocks and genitals." See Gordon, supra
(describing assaults). Women were assaulted by approximately 300 men when they
were forced to walk through a hallway known as the gauntlet. See Vojdik, supra
note 16, at 347 (describing attacks on women at Tailhook Convention).
28. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 94 (stating that several Army drill
sergeants were convicted on rape and sexual harassment charges at Aberdeen);
Tim Weiner, One Sergeant Pleads Guilty as Army Widens Sex Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1996, at Al (describing investigation and prosecution in sexual misconduct
cases at Aberdeen training base). One Aberdeen drill sergeant faced charges in-
volving twenty-one victims, six of whom he allegedly raped. See Elaine Sciolino,
Rape Witnesses Tell of Base Out of Control, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1997, at A14 (describ-
ing trials at Aberdeen).
29. See Pentagon Panel Will Examine Air Force Sex Assault Policies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
17, 2003, at A16 (describing military response in wake of sexual assault allegations
at Air Force Academy). The cadets' alleged retribution for reporting sexual assault
led members of Congress to request an investigation. See id. (describing congres-
sional leaders' call for Pentagon action after Academy cadets' accusations sur-
faced). Some military officials responded by focusing on victim responsibility,
480 [Vol. 55: p. 475
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Although the DoD responded after each of these scandals, it recog-
nized the need to take increased action when the media reported that
several military women serving in deployed locations were sexually as-
saulted.3 0 In February 2004, the Secretary of Defense responded to re-
ports about sexual assault of military members in Iraq and Kuwait by
directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
review how the DoD cares for victims of sexual assault.3 1 The task force
identified, among other problems, inconsistent sexual assault programs
throughout the DoD and recommended establishing a single office re-
sponsible for sexual assault matters.3 2 Heeding this advice, the DoD cre-
ated the Joint Task Force on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
(JTF-SAPR) which focused on care for victims, prevention training, and
system accountability.3 3 In 2005, the JTF-SAPR transitioned into a perma-
nent office-the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
(SAPRO)-which serves as the "single point of responsibility for sexual
assault policy matters" today.34
In addition to these steps taken by the DoD, Congress intervened and,
in the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, directed the Secretary of
Defense and the military services to develop policies and procedures to
rather than offender accountability, making comments such as: "if I walk down a
dark alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it doesn'tjustify my
being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risk by doing what I did,"
and "[a]re you the one girl going to Denver for an overnight in a hotel with five
guys? Probably not a good idea." Id. (quoting responses of two military officials to
sexual assault allegations).
30. See Schimpf, supra note 14, at 155-56 (recounting media reaction to sexual
assault allegations by deployed military women). The media generally "depicted a
military institution that fostered an environment of sexual assault and treated vic-
tims callously." Id. at 156.
31. See TASK FORCE REPORT, sup-a note 6, at v, vii (providing official memoran-
dum establishing initial task force and responsibilities to investigate military and
DoD sexual assault programs and policies). The ninety-day review was focused on
sexual assault prevention, reporting, victim support, and offender accountability.
See id. at vii (describing method of review undertaken by initial DoD sexual assault
task force).
32. See id. at 23, 46 (identifying inconsistent and incomplete sexual assault
prevention policies and programs throughout military services and recommending
single point of accountability).
33. See Hearings Part Two 2008, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Dir. Kaye
Whitley) (describing JTF-SAPR policy); Memorandum from David S.C. Chu,
Under Sec'y of Def., Dep't of Def., to Commander, Joint Task Force (Sexual As-
sault Prevention and Response), Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://www.sapr.mil/
contents/references/USD-PR%20JTF-SAPR%2008-20-04.pdf (directing compre-
hensive review of DoD sexual assault prevention and response policy).
34. See Heafings Part Two 2008, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Whitley) ("In
2005, the JTF-SAPR transitioned into SAPRO ... which is responsible for policy
and oversight."); DoD INSTRUCTION 6495.02, SExUAL AssAULT PREVENTION AND RE-
SPONSE PROGRAM PROCEDUREs 3, para. 5.3 (June 23, 2006), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/649502p.pdf (designating SAPRO as
DoD's "single point of responsibility for sexual assault policy matters").
2010] COMME1Nrr 481
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prevent and respond to sexual assault involving military members.3 5 In
response, the DoD issued two important documents: (1) a directive con-
taining the policy for sexual assault prevention and response; and (2) an
instruction providing guidance for the policy's implementation.3 6 The
statute also required that the DoD provide an annual report to Congress
on military sexual assaults that occurred during the preceding year and on
action taken in substantiated cases.3 7
B. The Suffering of Military Sexual Assault Victims Today
Despite Congressional and DoD prevention and response efforts, mil-
itary members continue to be sexually assaulted in alarmingly high num-
bers.3 8 In fiscal year 2008, there were 2,908 reports of sexual assault
involving military members, an increase of eight percent from the previ-
ous year.39 Additionally, reports of sexual assault by those deployed to
Iraq and Afghanistan increased by twenty-six percent.40 Studies of veter-
35. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577, 118 Stat. 1926, 1926-27 (2004) (current version
at 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2010)) (directing Secretary of Defense to develop comprehen-
sive policy and military departments to develop regulations regarding sexual as-
sault prevention and response).
36. See DoD DIRECTIVE 6495.01, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
(SAPR) PROGRAM 2-3, para. 4 (Oct. 6, 2005, Incorporating Change 1, Nov. 7, 2008)
(providing that DoD's aims include eliminating military sexual assault, providing
response to victims, and ensuring strong awareness and prevention programs);
DoD INSTRUCTION 6495.02, supra note 34, at 1, para. 1 (stating that this instruction
"[i]mplements policy, assigns responsibilities, provides guidance and procedures,
and establishes the Sexual Assault Advisory Council").
37. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005 § 577(f) (directing Secretary of Defense to submit annual report on sexual
assaults involving military members to Senate and House of Representatives Com-
mittees on Armed Services).
38. See Alarming Sex Assault Rate Found Among Vets, CBS NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/28/eveningnews/main4554665.shtml
(reporting extent of military sexual assault through data on veterans). The report
noted, "[a] Veterans Administration study found that one in seven female veterans
of Iraq and Afghanistan seeking medical care from the VA suffered sexual
trauma-everything from harassment to rape." Id. Additionally, "[t]he rate of vic-
timization experienced by female service members deployed during Desert Storm
and Desert Shield represents a tenfold increase over rates obtained using female
civilian community samples." Christine Hansen, A Considerable Sacrifice: The Costs of
Sexual Violence in the U.S. Armed Forces, Presented at the Military Culture and Gender
Conference, Univ. of Buffalo (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.law.buffalo.
edu/baldycenter/pdfs/MilCult05Hansen.pdf.
39. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 33 (providing fiscal year 2008 statistics
for reported military sexual assaults). "The Services received 2,265 Unrestricted
Reports involving Service members as either the subject and/or victim of sexual
assault (a 9% increase from FY07) . . . [and] 753 Restricted Reports involving Ser-
vice members as victims of sexual assault (a 7% increase from FY07)." Id.
40. See Mike Mount, Reports of Sexual Assault in Military Rise in 2008, CNN, Mar.
17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/17/military.assaults/index.
html (reviewing statistics released in DoD's annual report). In fiscal year 2008,
there were 165 reports of sexual assault in Iraq and Afghanistan as compared to
482 [Vol. 55: p. 475
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COMMENT
ans reveal the vast extent of the problem: female veterans' records indi-
cate that between twenty and thirty percent were raped or sexually
assaulted while in the military.4 1 The DoD's report also indicated that
most military victims of sexual assault are young, low-ranking, 42 and fe-
male.4 3 Most of the offenders are young, low-ranking, 4 4 and male.4 5
Interpretation of such military sexual assault statistics varies greatly,
with the DoD viewing the data more optimistically than some commenta-
131 in fiscal year 2007. See id. (noting increased reports of military sexual assault in
combat areas).
41. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 42 (stating rates of sexual assault reported in
veterans' studies were between 20%-30%). One study of female veterans who had
been sexually assaulted stated that 14% were gang raped and 20% were raped
more than once. See Hansen, supra note 38 (citing study that reported 30% of
female veterans had been sexually assaulted).
42. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 38, 40-41 figs.2, 3, 6 & 7 (providing age
and rank statistics of military sexual assault victims). Of the victims who made
unrestricted reports, over 48% were between twenty to twenty-four years old and
62.9% held one of the four lowest military ranks. See id. at 38 figs.2 & 3 (providing
statistics for victims who made unrestricted reports). For restricted reports, over
forty-seven percent of the victims were between twenty and twenty-four years old
and seventy percent held one of the lowest four military ranks. See id. at 40-41,
figs.6 & 7 (providing statistics for victims who made restricted reports). In con-
trast, the highest percentage of sexual assaults reported by deployed military mem-
bers involved slightly older and higher ranked offenders. See id. at 43-44, figs.10 &
11 (reporting that highest percentage of subjects of sexual assault cases in combat
areas were between twenty-five to thirty-four years old and held one of five highest
enlisted ranks).
43. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at app. c, tbl.5 (providing statistics of mili-
tary sexual assault victims' gender). Of the 2,265 unrestricted reports, 2,105 were
made by females and 160 were made by males. See id. (listing numbers of un-
restricted reports by gender). Of the 753 restricted reports, 657 were made by
females, 83 by males, and thirteen were listed as unknown. See id. (providing num-
bers of restricted reports by gender). In addition, Veterans Affairs (VA) specialists
have stated that military women are twenty times more likely than military men to
experience sexual assault or harassment. See Linda Stewart Ball, VA Panel Discusses
Assault, Harassment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 11, 2009, available at http://
www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/APStories/stories/D980NRC81.html (citing
VA specialists who counsel military veterans). Yet "more than half of veterans seek-
ing treatment at the VA for military sexual assault are men." Id. (noting extent of
male military sexual assault victims). The explanation for this disparity is that
there are more men in the military, thus even though women are more vulnerable,
more men are victims. See id. (discussing male victims of military sexual assault and
reporting barriers).
44. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 39 figs.4 & 5 (providing statistics on
subjects of military sexual assault reports). In unrestricted reports, 32.7% of the
service member subjects were between twenty to twenty-four years old and 46.4%
held one of the four lowest military ranks. See id. (providing age and gender statis-
tics for service member subjects in reported sexual assaults).
45. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at app. c, tbl.5 (listing numbers of subjects
in military sexual assault investigations by gender). Of the 1,438 investigations
completed in fiscal year 2008, 1,265 involved male subjects, eighteen involved fe-
male subjects, and 155 were reported as gender-unknown. See id. (same).
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tors. 46 The SAPRO interprets the increase in reports as an indication of
the system's success, claiming that it shows military members' trust in the
system has improved.4 7 Other commentators, however, suggest the in-
crease in reports may actually reflect a rise in the number of sexual as-
saults-a real possibility given the correlation between increased rates of
sexual violence and war. 48 Furthermore, military leaders are still unable
to address the majority of sexual assaults because less than ten percent of
assaults that occur each year are reported.49 Even where military leaders
were able to act-that is, when sufficient evidence for disciplinary action
against the offender was available-only thirty-eight percent of cases were
sent to trial by courts-martial. 50 Hence, although the increase in reports is
46. Compare John J. Kruzel & Michael J. Carden, Defense Department Releases
Sexual Assault Statistics, ARMED FORCES PRESs SERV., Mar. 17, 2009, available at http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53525 (reporting that increased
sexual assault reports are viewed as positive by DoD officials), with Benedict, supra
note 12 (criticizing interpretation of increased sexual assault reports as positive
result). The SAPRO director stated that "[t]he increase of reports means the
[DoD's] policy of getting victims to come forward is making a difference." Kruzel
& Carden, supra (providing DoD's interpretation of increased sexual assault re-
ports). In contrast, Benedict argues that the DoD cannot validly interpret the
increase in reports of sexual assault as positive because the increase might actually
indicate a rise in the number of sexual assaults and only ten percent of sexual
assaults are reported. See Benedict, supra note 12 ("The only accurate way to mea-
sure military sexual assault is to rely on veterans who are no longer afraid to report
it, and those studies indicate no good news at all.").
47. See Kruzel & Carden, supra note 46 (quoting SAPRO director interpreting
increased sexual assault reports as positive).
48. See Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45
DuKE L.J. 651, 673 (1996) ("In wartime, military rape rates are increased far more
above civilian levels than are rates of other violent crime.") Morris compared rates
of violent crime among military men and civilian men in both peacetime and war-
time in arriving at this conclusion. See id. at 659 (describing study of violent crime
rates including murder/non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, and forci-
ble rape). "In the war context ... military rape rates in the combat theater studied
rose far above civilian levels, while rates of other violent crime did not." Id. at 664.
Thus, "rape is distinct from other crimes of violence in war" because the rate of
rape increases more during wartime than the rates of other violent crimes. Id. at
673 (concluding that changes in military rape rates were meaningfully different
from changes in rates of other violent crimes during peacetime and wartime). Yet
the conclusions of this study were not without criticism. See Diane H. Mazur, A Call
to Arms, 22 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 55-56 (1999) (critiquing Morris' study).
49. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 51 (stating that DoD estimates military
sexual assaults are underreported based on reports made through anonymous
surveys); see also Katie Couric, Sexual Assault Permeates U.S. Armed Forces, CBS NEWS,
Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/17/eveningnews/
main4872713.shtml (stating Pentagon officials recognize sexual assault as most
under-documented military crime). Additionally, a 2006 survey revealed that only
one-fifth of military men and women who experienced unwanted sexual contact
made an official report. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 51 (citing Defense Man-
power Data Center Gender Relations Survey). "Comparatively, in civilian life the
FBI puts the rate of unreported rape at 60%." Benedict, supra note 4, at 42.
50. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (providing breakdown of disciplinary
action taken in completed investigations of military sexual assaults). Of the re-
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viewed positively by some officials, the military is certainly far from win-
ning the battle against sexual assault.5 1
III. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT
In 2004, the initial DoD task force developed the foundation for the
sexual assault prevention and response policy. 5 2 To date, the DoD's focus
has centered primarily on caring for victims and educating military mem-
bers about sexual assault through training.5 3 Additionally, legislative ef-
forts to combat sexual assault resulted in the revision of the sex offenses
statute of the UCMJ in 2006.54
A. Victim Reporting Options and Service Member Training Programs
Military victims of sexual assault can choose to make either a re-
stricted or an unrestricted report.5 5 The restricted reporting option al-
maining cases, thirty percent were handled through non-judicial punishment and
thirty-two percent through administrative actions and discharges. See id. (same).
51. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL RE-
QUESTERS, MILITARY PERSONNEL: DoD's AND THE COAST GUARD'S SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS FACE IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT CHAL-
LENGEs 4-8 (2008), [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08924.pdf (reporting to Congress problems facing DoD sexual assault
prevention and response program). The GAO found that several factors hindered
the DoD's efforts:
(1) DoD's guidance may not adequately address some important issues,
such as how to implement its program in deployed and joint environ-
ments; (2) most, but not all, commanders support the program; (3) re-
quired sexual assault prevention and response training is not consistently
effective; and (4) factors such as DoD-reported shortage of mental health
care providers affect whether service members who are victims of sexual
assault can or do access mental health services.
Id. at 2.
52. See Hearings Part Two 2008, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Whitley) (stat-
ing JTF-SAPR's policy "revolutionized the Department's sexual assault response
structure"). For a further discussion of the initial task force and subsequently
formed SAPRO, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
53. See David Chu, Undersecretary of Def. for Personnel and Readiness, Spe-
cial Defense Department Briefing on the New Sexual Assault Policy (Jan. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050104-1922.html) (ex-
plaining care for sexual assault victims and prevention education are DoD priori-
ties); Knies, supra note 12, at 6 (explaining DoD has focused mainly on training
and response to military sexual assault).
54. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006)).
The UCMJ comprises the United States military's criminal law which applies to all
military members. See generally EsTELA I. VELEZ POLLACK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL: AN OVERVIEW, 1
(2004), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21850.pdf (reviewing military
criminal courts' features and procedures). For a further discussion of the revised
Article 120, see infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
55. See DoD INSTRUCTION 6495.02, supra note 34, at 12 E2 (explaining re-
stricted reporting option for DoD sexual assault prevention and response pro-
gram). "The restricted reporting option is only available to those sexual assault
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lows a victim to access medical care and support services while controlling
whether a criminal investigation is initiated, while the unrestricted report-
ing option makes the details of the assault reportable to law enforcement
and commanding officers. 5 6 The addition of the restricted reporting op-
tion was significant given the reluctance among military members to re-
port sexual assault.5 7 This development, however, required compromise
between the DoD and commanders because the latter generally prefer to
know of all criminal offenses occurring within their units.5 8 Unfortu-
nately, despite the DoD's efforts, reports indicate that not all service mem-
bers understand how to use the restricted reporting option.5 9
The DoD also directed the services to implement periodic training for
all service members on the sexual assault prevention and response pro-
gram, including the reporting options; yet, the training needs considera-
ble reform.60 While the DoD annual training requirement does not
victims who are [s]ervice members; however, it may not be an option if the sexual
assault occurs outside of the military installation or the victim first reports to a
civilian facility and/or a civilian authority." Id.
56. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10 (explaining restricted reporting
option). Under restricted reporting, the member's identity is kept confidential
and, although the member may receive an anonymous sexual assault forensic
exam, the investigation process is not initiated. See id. at 10 (describing proce-
dures for restricted reports). Commanders are, however, provided some non-iden-
tifying information regarding the incident to allow them to ensure the safety of
members within their command. See id. (same). In contrast, under unrestricted
reporting once a victim reports a sexual assault, the commander is notified and the
investigation process begins immediately. See id. (explaining procedures for un-
restricted reports). Base personnel, known as the Sexual Assault Response Coordi-
nator (SARC) and victim advocates, "work with the victims to help them
understand the reporting options." See id. (discussing procedures for victim
assistance).
57. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (detailing barriers to reporting
sexual assault). Service members reported fear of reprisal, concern that a victim
would not be believed by superiors and other unit personnel, repercussions for the
victim's own misconduct, and distrust in the ability of commanders to effectively
respond to a sexual assault. See id. (explaining that some barriers to reporting
sexual assaults were "consistent with those in the civilian community while others
[were] unique in a military setting").
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 14 (reporting some military com-
manders "supported the programs but did not like the restricted reporting option
because they felt it hindered their ability to protect members of the unit or disci-
pline alleged offenders"); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 31-32 (noting ten-
sion between encouraging victims to report through restricted reporting and
military "commanders' solemn responsibility to hold offenders accountable and to
ensure community safety").
59. See GAO REPORT, supTa note 51, at 22 (finding that despite training not all
service members understand restricted reporting option). Of the service members
who received sexual assault prevention and response training, 13%-43% at installa-
tions within the United States and 13%-28% at overseas installations did not know
how to use the restricted reporting option. See id. (same).
60. See Hearings Part Two 2008, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Brenda S. Far-
rell, Dir., Def. Capabilities and Mgmt., Gov't Accountability Office) (reporting that
DoD sexual assault prevention and response training program was not "consist-
ently effective").
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specify a format, it does recommend that training for junior enlisted per-
sonnel "incorporate adult learning theory, which includes group participa-
tion and interaction."6 1 Regrettably, the services have not always heeded
this advice. Contrary to the recommended format, training is sometimes
computer-based or takes place in large group settings with no active partic-
ipation. 62 Compounding this failure to implement recommended train-
ing techniques, many service members do not pay attention during the
training-likely because "the training relie [s] heavily on power point
briefings" and "the material is not engaging."6 3 Moreover, military mem-
bers do not always take the training seriously, and "some described [it] as
a vehicle for units to 'check the box' indicating that [the unit] met the
training requirement."6 4
B. Revisions to the Sex Offenses Statute
In 2005, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to review the
UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial to determine what changes were
necessary to improve the military justice system's response to sexual as-
sault.6 5 As a result of this effort, a revised version of Article 120-address-
61. DoD INSTRUCTON 6495.02, supra note 34, at E.3.2.2.2 (recommending
prevention education format). Among the findings reported by the initial DoD
task force was that "junior enlisted personnel prefer training conducted by those
with first-hand experience." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 26-27 (describing
military members' preferences). Junior enlisted personnel stated that such testi-
monials would be more likely "to grab and keep their attention" and that training
conducted by leadership would reinforce written policies. Id. (justifying prefer-
ences for training).
62. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 24-26 (describing formats for current
sexual assault prevention and response training and detailing service member per-
ceptions of training); see also Beth Kelley Horine, Bystander Intervention Vital in
Preventing Sexual Assault, (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=
123116806 (reporting Air Force's plans to transition annual sexual assault preven-
tion training to computer-based training in fiscal year 2009). At nine of the four-
teen installations surveyed by the GAO, more than half of the service members
"indicated that the training they received did not include a participatory or scena-
rio-based component." GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 24 (noting inconsistencies
in training). "The SARC at one installation ... said that the training she provides
units encompasses about 800 personnel at a time, which can make it difficult to
allow for interaction or individual questions from any of the participants." Id. at
26.
63. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 26 (describing military members' accounts
of problems with current military sexual assault prevention and response training).
64. See id. (noting lack of commitment to prevention training). Not only was
training ineffective, the GAO found that a considerable portion of military mem-
bers had not received the required training despite statutory and DoD require-
ments. See id. at 17-18 (explaining that only between sixty-one and eighty-eight
percent of military members surveyed had received required sexual assault preven-
tion and response training in preceding twelve months).
65. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 571, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 113
(2008)) (directing review of UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial to improve re-
sponse to sexual assault).
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ing rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct-became law in
2006.66 The significant revisions included a series of graded offenses, im-
proved definitions, and removal of "without consent" as an element of
rape.6 7 In addition, consent and mistake of fact as to consent became
affirmative defenses to the charges of rape, aggravated sexual assault, ag-
gravated sexual contact, and abusive sexual contact.68 Significantly, re-
moving the "without consent" element and making consent an affirmative
defense effectively shifts the burden of proving consent to the
defendant. 69
This new sexual offenses statute has been met with criticism both
from scholars who disagree with the change and scholars who believe the
change was needed.70 For example, one supporter of the change argues
that the revision does not adequately incorporate the advice of reform-
66. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006))(amending UCMJ Article 120 by adding provisions for rape, sexual assault, and
other sexual misconduct offenses).
67. SeeJessica L. Cornett, Note, The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent
Changes be Enough?, 29 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 99, 108-09 (2008) (explaining signifi-
cance of Article 120 changes). The previous Article 120 addressed rape, but did
not include a series of graded offenses, which the new statute delineates based on
aggravating factors. See id. at 108 (providing new categories of offenses). Also, the
revision "details many definitions with a clarity that was previously lacking" for
terms such as "sexual act, sexual contact, grievous bodily harm, and force." Id.
(listing some terms defined in revised Article 120). The previous elements for
rape under Article 120 were: "that the accused committed the act of sexual inter-
course; and that the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and without con-
sent." Mark L. Johnson, Forks in the Road: Recent Developments in Substantive Criminal
Law, ARMY LAw., June 2006, at 23, 27, n.69 (citing UCMJ Article 120(a) (2005)).
The revised definition of rape is:
Any person .. . who causes another person of any age to engage in a
sexual act by- (1) using force against that other person; (2) causing
grievous bodily harm to any person; (3) threatening or placing that other
person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily
harm, or kidnaping [sic];(4) rendering another person unconscious; or
(5) administering to another person by force or threat of force, or with-
out the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or
other similar substance and thereby substantially impairs the ability of
that other person to appraise or control conduct ....
10 U.S.C. § 920(a).
68. See 10 U.S.C. § 920(r) (listing consent and mistake of fact as affirmative
defenses under specified subsections).
69. See Cornett, supra note 67, at 109 (describing effect of removal of "without
consent" element). The defendant must prove consent or mistake of fact by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Johnson, supra note 67, at 27 (explaining
mechanics of revised Article 120). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the prose-
cution must overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (same).
70. Compare Knies, supra note 12, at 1 (contending that revision of Article 120
was needed), with Keith B. Lofland, The Neglected Debate over Sexual Assault Policy in
the Department of Defense, 55 NAVAL L. REv. 311, 312 (2008) (criticizing statutory
changes to Article 120 as "a result of bad social science and worse policy assump-
tions flowing from that poor science").
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ers.7 This commentator suggests that for the Article 120 revisions to be
truly effective in preventing sexual assault, it should have required affirma-
tive consent of both parties before sexual penetration. 72 Moreover, an-
other critic considers elimination of the consent element "a step towards
the treatment of rape as a strict-liability offense" because it shifts the bur-
den of proving consent to the defendant.7 3 Nevertheless, a military appel-
late court recently held that the revised Article 120 did not, on its face,
unconstitutionally shift the burden of disproving an element of the of-
fense to the defendant. 74
Despite these recent revisions, however, the structure of the military
justice system limits the likelihood that the new Article 120 will prevent
sexual assault of military members.7 5 The military justice system is com-
mander-driven-that is, individual commanders have discretion in decid-
ing whether to pursue criminal charges in response to allegations of
sexual misconduct.76 Therefore, the statute's ability to deter future sexual
assaults will largely depend on the decisions of individual commanders. 7 7
Unfortunately, not all commanders are supportive of the sexual assault
prevention and response program.78 Perhaps not by coincidence, nearly
71. See Knies, supra note 12, at 21 (contending that "Congress failed to truly
reform" Article 120). Studies and military appellate courts advocated for a statute
focused on consent rather than on force, while Congress "further entrenched" the
force element with the revised statute. See id. (describing failure in reform effort).
72. See Knies, supra note 12, at 27-28 (advocating revisions to Article 120 to
require affirmative verbal consent before penetration).
73. See Lofland, supra note 70, at 335 (arguing that revisions to Article 120
were improperly based on social and political agendas). See alsoJohnson, supra
note 67, at 28 (describing practical application and constitutional concerns involv-
ing Article 120 revision).
74. See United States v. Crotchett, 67 M.J. 713, 715 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009)
(holding that revised Article 120 appropriately places burden of proof for each
element on government). Although the facial challenge to the statute failed, the
court did not address what result might occur when the statute is applied to the
facts of a litigated case. See id. at 714 (limiting extent of holding).
75. See Knies, supra note 12, at 6 (contending revisions to Article 120 are "un-
likely to prevent the crime from occurring"). Article 120 is still focused on force
despite recommendations by legal scholars and courts to reform rape statutes to
require consent to protect sexual autonomy. See id. (describing reform proposals
in rape law).
76. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 15-16 (explaining role of military com-
manders in controlling military justice system). "In both DoD and the Coast
Guard, commanders are responsible for discipline of misconduct, including sexual
assault, and they have a variety of judicial and administrative options at their dispo-
sal." Id. These options include trial by courts-martial, nonjudicial punishment,
and administrative action. See id. at 16 (listing disposition options for discipline of
misconduct). For a further discussion of the options available under the UCMJ,
see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-8 (describing commanders' options).
77. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 15-16 (noting military commanders'
responsibilities in response to criminal conduct).
78. See id. at 13 (stating that some commanders are unsupportive of sexual
assault prevention program). At three of the fourteen installations visited, pro-
gram officials stated that they met resistance from commanders when they at-
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half of reported sexual assaults are disposed of with no action taken.79
Additionally, many sexual assault cases are disposed of administratively
through nonjudicial punishment, which is described by some as "no more
than a slap on the wrist."8 0
IV. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY SEXUAL AssAULT
Past efforts to combat military sexual assault, although commendable,
have failed to target the source of the problem-the culture.8 1 A miso-
gynistic, hyper-masculine culture that subordinates military women pre-
dictably leads to high rates of sexual assault. 82 Recognizing that the
contemporary United States military culture is masculine and misogynistic
makes the link between the culture and sexual assault clear.83
tempted to display sexual assault prevention and response materials in work areas
and living quarters. See id. at 14 (citing lack of commander support).
79. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 37, tbl.4 (providing statistics for disposi-
tion of completed sexual assault investigations in fiscal year 2008). In nearly half
of the completed investigations, commanders could not take action for a variety of
reasons including cases that were under civilian court or foreign authority, inci-
dents in which the subject was unidentified, or cases where punitive action was not
possible. See id. (same). Notably, no action was taken against 1,074 subjects be-
cause the cases were classified as "unsubstantiated or unfounded, lack[ing] suffi-
cient evidence, involved a victim that recanted, or involved a subject or victim who
died." Id. at 36 (providing reasons for no action taken). The classification of these
statistics has been cited by one commentator as demonstrating the military's lack
of transparency. See Cornett, supra note 67, at 112 (contending unclear DoD data
prevents adequate response to military sexual assault).
80. Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Benedict) (asserting that
punishment of majority of sexual assault offenders was mild). In 2007, only one-
twelfth of reported sexual assaults went to court-martial. See id. (describing low
rates of military prosecution in sexual assault cases). "In 2008, a mere 10.9% of all
reported assaults went to court-martial." Id. See also Couric, supra note 49 (noting
that punishment in military sexual assault cases is often inadequate).
81. Cf Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 354-55 (arguing efforts to
prevent sexual assault through education and legal reform have limited potential
to successfully change underlying cultural causes).
82. See Valorie Vojdik, Women and War: A Critical Discourse: Panel Two-Women
Warriors, 20 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. & JusT. 338, 346 (2005) (arguing hyper-mascu-
line military culture "essentially require[s]" use of sexual violence to denigrate wo-
men). The link between masculinity, misogyny, and homophobia has been
similarly identified as the root cause of sexual violence by male athletes. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Messner, The Triad of Violence in Men's Sports, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE
CuLTURE 25, 26 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 2005) (connecting culture to sexual
violence by male athletes).
83. Cf Morris, supra note 48, at 701-04 (describing "specific set of attitudes
that appears to be conductive to rape"). Attitudes toward masculinity, sexuality,
rape myths, acceptance of violence against women, hostility toward women, and
sex-role stereotyping are all associated with propensity to rape. See id. (explaining
factors that increase rape proclivity).
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A. A Culture of Domination and Denigration
The contemporary United States military culture has been described
by sociologists and legal scholars as misogynistic, masculine, or hyper-mas-
culine.8 4 "Masculinity is traditionally defined around the idea of power,"
therefore the military-serving as both the symbolic and actual source of
the nation's power-is the ideal forming ground for a culture of masculin-
ity.8 5 Reflecting the masculine military culture, Retired Navy Admiral
James Webb commented on the purported virtues of the military by pos-
ing the question, "[w] here in the country can someone go to find out if he
is a man? And where can someone who knows he is a man go to celebrate
his masculinity?"8 6 Webb further stated that the inclusion of women in
the military made male service members "feel stripped, symbolically and
actually."8 7 Hence, the admission of women into the military disrupted its
masculine identity.8 8
As Webb's comments demonstrate, the social construction of mascu-
linity is premised as the opposite of femininity; thus, to reinforce masculin-
ity the military firmly draws gender boundaries to maintain this
84. See, e.g., CAROL BuRKE, CAMP ALL-AMERICAN, HANOI JANE, AND THE HIGH-
AND-TIGHT 12-24 (2004) (demonstrating masculinity and misogyny of military cul-
ture); Morris, supra note 48, at 708-10 (describing masculinity and hyper-masculin-
ity in military culture). Hyper-masculinity involves "stereotypic masculinity and
interpersonal opportunism" that includes "a focus on toughness, self-sufficiency,
and dominance." Morris, supra, at 701, 710 (explaining construction of various
forms of masculinity). "[O]ne military law expert has [identified] the 'warrior
mystique,' an unspoken, unwritten, unofficial aspect of military culture . . . ."
Michael I. Spak & Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military Culture on Responding to Sexual
Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L. REv. 79, 80 (2004). These commenta-
tors explain that:
The warrior mystique pervades military culture and includes . . . fierce
competitiveness for promotions and assignments; a "good old boys" net-
work; the notion that women do not belong in combat; an inability or
unwillingness on the part of men in the military to see women in the
military as equals; the idea that, because the military teaches young men
to be violent to protect their country, the country should look the other
way whenever those young men are violent even against women, because,
after all, boys will be boys, and they are only doing what they have been
taught and are expected to do . . . and the idea that female soldiers are
not real soldiers.
Id.
85. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 501 (1991) (describing exclusion and segregation
practices as efforts to preserve military masculinity).
86. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 343 (describing response to women's integra-
tion into United States military).
87. Id. (explaining perceived impact of women's integration into military).
Webb described the military as providing a "ritualistic rite of passage into man-
hood." See id.
88. See id. (explaining resistance to military integration).
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distinction.8 9 Likewise, military members define themselves "in relation to
the outsider," where the outsider is the enemy and anyone who is not
hyper-masculine or aggressive.9 0 Hence, the military distances itself from
persons perceived as not masculine, such as women and homosexuals,
which may explain the restrictions on these groups.9 1 Consequently,
when insecurity about masculinity arises, "nervous men seek reassurances
of their masculinity through group rituals that express domination over
other groups."92 One method of expressing masculinity through domina-
tion identified within the culture of both male athletic teams and the
United States military is insult talk.9 3 As an example, drill instructors at
boot camp put down male recruits by feminizing them, calling them "pus-
sies," "sissies," or "girls," to teach them that "to be degraded is to be
female."94
This name-calling illustrates that the military's masculinity is not just a
belief; it is a social practice, which is continually reinforced by a culture of
domination by the masculine and subordination of the feminine.9 5 For
instance, military cadence calls, rituals, and jokes frequently devalue wo-
89. See Karst, supra note 85, at 503-04, 509 (discussing how masculinity is de-
fined by society and how restricting access to military service maintains gender
line).
90. Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 2-3 (statement of Benedict) (discussing
research on military culture and attitudes towards women). "The masculinity that
is definitive of the military in-group is, not surprisingly, defined in contrast to the
'other'-in particular, in contrast to women." Morris, supra note 48, at 716.
91. Cf Karst, supra note 85, at 509 (explaining how ideology of masculinity
rationalizes restrictions on women and gays).
92. See id. at 506 (stating that masculinity is expressed through domination of
others). For men, the fear of other men seeing them as "weak, feminine, [or] not
manly" creates anxiety about losing social status and can lead to the use of "sexual
conquests as a form of currency to gain status among other men." Michael Kim-
mel, Men, Masculinity, and the Rape Culture, in TRANsFoRMING A RAPE CULTURE 141,
14547 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 2005) (citing masculine fragility as source of
sexual violence).
93. See BURKE, supra note 84, at 13 (describing use of insults based on feminin-
ity in military training). "Trash talking on high school basketball courts and insult.
talk among teammates off the field have common traits: They establish hierarchies,
they involve personal insults or put-downs, often as calls to defend masculinity and
honor, and they often degrade objects defined as feminine." Messner, supra note
82, at 27-28 (describing sexual insult talk among male athletes as domination and
subordination).
94. BURKE, supra note 84, at 13 (discussing transmission of military culture in
boot camp). The feminization of male recruits may be as simple as a drill instruc-
tor stating, "Come on, ladies." See id. (noting gendered-insults used in military
training). Although military rules prohibit the use of racial epithets and curses,
drill instructors "still routinely denigrate recruits by calling them pussy, girl, bitch,lady and dyke." Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Benedict) (contend-
ing misogyny permeates military culture).
95. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 341-42 (citing military social practices that
preserve hierarchy of masculinity over femininity).
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men and glorify sexual violence against women.96 Such misogyny perme-
ates military social practices and reinforces the subordination of women. 97
As one scholar explained, "masculinity as a social practice rationalizes the
inequality and subordination of women within the military and society.""9
B. Recognizing the Culture as the Source of Military Sexual Assault
While feminists differ in their perception of sexual assault, the defini-
tions espoused by some feminist commentators are instructive in explain-
ing the prevalence of such assault in the military.99 The prevailing
feminist definition of sexual assault advocates understanding the crime
from the victim's point of view: sexual assault is "an act of the subordina-
96. See Abrams, supra note 16, at 219 n.9 (describing misogynistic behaviors at
Naval Academy); Vojdik, supra note 16, at 342 ("A variety of rituals and practices
compel males to prove their social identity as men through both symbolic and
actual enactments of hyper-masculinity that denigrates women."). Examples of
military cadence calls, which are chanted while marching, include a variation on
the song "The Prettiest Girl: The ugliest girl I ever did see / was beating her face
against a tree / I picked her up; I punched her twice; / She said, 'Oh Middy,
you're much too nice.'" and "My Girl Is a Vegetable: My Girl ain't got no eyes /
Just two sockets full o' flies . . . / Sometimes I even play ajoke / Pull the plugs and
watch her choke." Abrams, supra (citing Carol Burke, Dames at Sea, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIc, Aug. 17 & 24, 1992, at 16, 18). One cadence that celebrates sexual vio-
lence against women is "The S&M Man," sung to the tune of "The Candy Man":
"Who can take a chain saw / Cut the bitch in two / Fuck the bottom half / and
give the upper half to you." BURKE, supra note 84, at xi (describing "officially
banned songs that nevertheless continued to be performed in small groups").
97. See Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Benedict) (contending
military language "not only perpetuates an antagonistic view of women, but
teaches it"); Vojdik, supra note 16, at 342-43 (arguing that military language deni-
grates military women). But see Mazur, supra note 48, at 56 (contending that "[t] he
factual support . .. underlying the assumption of hostility against female [military
members] ... consists of a small smattering of trivialities that have no relevance to
day-to-day military service by women."). Misogynist language is so engrained in
military culture that conversations among military members are "riddled with sex-
ist and homophobic insults." See BENEDICr, supra note 3, at 50-51 (noting con-
tempt for women in military). A Marine describing his initial Marine Corps
training explained, "The Drill Instructor's nightly homiletic speeches, full of un-
abashed hatred of women, were part of the second phase of boot camp: the pro-
cess of rebuilding recruits into Marines." Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 3
(statement of Benedict) (quoting Martin Smith, Iraq Veterans Against the War 2008,
in WARRIOR WRITERs: RE-MAKING SENSE 34 (Lovella Calica ed., 2008)).
98. Vojdik, supra note 16, at 341 (explaining how masculinity of military cul-
ture operates through social practices).
99. Compare SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
376 (1975) (defining rape as violence), with Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 647 (1983)
(arguing that rape is male sexuality expressed). Brownmiller contended that rape
is a "violent act of degradation and possession . . . designed to intimidate and
inspire fear" and urged recognition of aspects of culture that promote rape by
men. See BROWNMILLER, supra, at 391 (proposing violence-based understanding of
rape).
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tion" of the victim to the assailant.10 0 Thus, a person who sexually assaults
another is dominating that person, not fulfilling sexual desires.1 0 ' Sexual
assault as a means of domination is "what is meant by the oft-repeated but
little understood phrase that rape is about power, not sex."102
If sexual assault is an act of domination, then the prevalence of sexual
assault in the military is understandable given its hyper-masculine and mis-
ogynistic culture.103 The culture insists that members prove themselves as
masculine, which is often achieved through the domination of others.10 4
While some members might be able to achieve domination through legiti-
mate means, others resort to domination through sexual assault.1 05 The
latter member resorts to violence and denigration of women (or other
men) in order to prove his masculinity. 0 6 Thus, sexual assault is a "natu-
ral part of the [military] institution" because of the culture.10 7
100. See MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 652 (describing rape from "women's
point of view").
101. See BENEDICT, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining motivations for rape as in-
cluding "anger, sexual sadism, and the need to dominate and destroy").
102. Id. at 6 (describing rape as domination).
103. See Hearings 2009, supra note 1, at 1-2 (statement of Benedict) (describ-
ing military culture). Benedict explained how the military culture combined with
psychology of assailants and the nature of war leads some military members to
sexually assault others. See id. at 1-3 (identifying misogyny and emphasis on hyper-
masculine norms as contributing factors in military sexual assault).
104. See Karst, supra note 85, at 505-06 (identifying ideology of masculinity as
source of subordination of others); Vojdik, supra note 16, at 342 ("A variety of
rituals and practices compel males to prove their social identity as men through
both the symbolic and actual enactments of a hyper-masculinity that denigrates
women.").
105. See Karst, supra note 85, at 506-07 (explaining how demonstration of mas-
culinity takes different forms). While some men seek to establish their masculinity
through achievement at work or in the community, others may resort to personal
violence to assert power over others. See id. (describing variations of masculine
domination).
106. See id. at 507 ("A man who finds the path of individual achievement to be
rough going may try to express his power by engaging in private violence such as
rape or wife-beating."); Vojdik, supra note 82, at 346 (asserting that sexual violence
against military women is used to prove manhood).
107. See Vojdik, supra note 82, at 346 (reflecting on military culture). Vojdik
explains that sexual violence is "essentially required by the hyper-masculine cul-
ture." Id. (citing military culture as source of sexual violence). "Violence against
women and the denigration of women is necessary to prove the manhood of the
warrior." Id. For example, at the Citadel, derogatory female terms were used to
criticize cadets who were not performing up to standard. See id. at 344-45. (ex-
plaining how denigration of women is used to prove masculinity). Additionally, to
reaffirm their own masculinity, some male cadets distinguished themselves from
other male cadets viewed as feminine, weak, or gay, and chanted cadence calls that
celebrated sexual violence against women. See id. at 345 (describing Citadel
culture).
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C. The Inability of the Current Approach to Change Military Culture
The current approach to prevent and respond to military sexual as-
sault is incapable of effectively addressing the source of the problem-the
military culture-for three reasons.1 0 8 First, efforts directed at improving
the military's response to victims, though vitally important, do not help
prevent sexual assault. 109 Specifically, while the response victims receive
can help improve their recovery, it does not impact the aspects of the mili-
tary culture conducive to sexual assault.' 10
Second, the DoD's required training is inadequate and indications
are that the training may become an even more futile attempt to change
the military culture.' 1 Studies have shown that attempts to prevent sexual
assault through brief educational programs aimed at changing attitudes
and behaviors are largely ineffective. 112 Notably, some studies have even
found that sexual assault training produced a rebound effect of increasing
rape-supportive attitudes."13
108. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 4, at 45 (contending that current efforts are
not enough). Benedict asserts that military sexual assault will persist "as long as
the military culture remains unchanged." Id. (proposing that change could begin
with commanders and officers).
109. See Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 341-42 (noting that victim
response focuses only on post-assault and "do[es] not embody a primary prevent-
ative potential"). Victim care after the sexual assault is a tertiary level of interven-
tion that may reduce harm to the victim, but cannot prevent the crime that has
already occurred. See id. (describing tertiary level intervention efforts). In con-
trast, primary level intervention seeks to prevent the assault from occurring at all.
See id. (noting that preventative education programs often realized through social
policy initiatives seek to provide primary level intervention).
110. See Schimpf, supra note 14, at 159-61 (explaining victim advocates' ability
to aid in sexual assault victim's recovery). The purpose of victim advocates is to
educate sexual assault victims about the legal process and provide emotional sup-
port. See id. (describing responsibilities of victim advocates).
111. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 17 (revealing ineffectiveness of mili-
tary sexual assault prevention and response training); Horine, supra note 62
(describing plan to transition Air Force sexual assault training to computer-based
training).
112. See, e.g., Karen Bachar & Mary P. Koss, From Prevalence to Prevention: Clos-
ing the Gap Between What We Know About Rape and What We Do, in SOURCEBOOK ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 117, 136-37 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001) (con-
cluding that studies show current prevention-education programs are ineffective);
Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 352-53 (citing studies that found inconsis-
tent lasting impact of rape prevention programs).
113. See Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 353-54 (describing studies
that found unintended rebound effects from prevention education); see also
Bachar & Koss, supra note 112, at 133-34 (citing studies that found rape prevention
training produced no change or increased rape-supportive attitudes). For exam-
ple, one study sought to increase victim empathy and decrease rape-supportive
behaviors by having male participants listen to an audiotape of a female describing
an acquaintance rape. See id. at 133-34 (describing rape prevention study). The
outcome was the opposite of what was intended because participants "self-reported
greater likelihood of committing a rape or engaging in rape-supportive behaviors."
See id. (noting rebound effect).
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Finally, legislative revision of the sex offenses section of the UCMJ is
unlikely to change the military culture due to the relative infrequency with
which offenders are actually prosecuted under it. 1 4 Under the present
system, individual commanders retain the authority to decide whether to
pursue courts-martial, thus constraining the military's ability to respond to
sexual assault because authority is dispersed among a large number of in-
dividuals who may or may not support the sexual assault prevention pro-
gram or consider the program a priority.11 5 Even in those cases that are
sent to courts-martial, the inexperience of military prosecutors weakens
the ability of the military to hold offenders accountable and to change the
culture." Ultimately, the revision of Article 120 will not change the mili-
tary culture because the drafters did not consider social and cultural pat-
terns that impact the effectiveness of the law.117 Rather than addressing
the cultural underpinnings of military sexual assault, the committee that
advised Congress on the Article 120 revisions focused on the adequacy of
prosecution for sexual misconduct under the old statute.118
114. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (noting thirty-eight percent of com-
pleted sexual assault investigations were sent to courts-martial in fiscal year 2008);
see also Carmody & Carrington, supra note 13, at 344-45 (arguing that Australian
law reform efforts have largely failed to prevent sexual assault). Sexual assault law
reform has been directed at deterring potential offenders, yet mistreatment of vic-
tims and high attrition rates in prosecution means the legal system is more likely to
harm victims than to deter offenders. See Carmody & Carrington, supra (describ-
ing failure of legal reform efforts).
115. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 13-16 (explaining military com-
manders' role in responding to reports of sexual assault and reporting lack of pro-
gram support by some commanders). The GAO found that most, but not all
commanders supported the DoD's sexual assault prevention and response pro-
gram. See id. at 13 (finding inconsistent program support). For example, some
commanders prevented unit members from receiving the required training and
refused to permit the display of program materials within the unit. See id. at 14-15
(describing resistance to program implementation).
116. See Couric, supra note 49 (questioning low prosecution rates in military
sexual assault cases). Military officials have acknowledged that sexual assault pros-
ecution and conviction rates need improvement. See id. (quoting Pentagon offi-
cial). Commenting on this problem, a retired member of the Army's Judge
Advocate General (JAG) Corps stated, "A lot of times what we see in the JAG court
is very inexperienced, brand spanking new lawyers being given rape cases. . . ." Id.
(quoting Vivian Gembara).
117. See Penelope Pether, Critical Discourse Analysis, Rape Law and the juy In-
struction Simplification Project, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 63 (1999) (quoting Lisa Froh-
mann & Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Reform and Social Construction: Violence, Gender, and
the Law, 19 LAw AND Soc. INQUIRY 829, 835 (1995)). Pether explains why legal
reform that does not account for the influence of cultural stories and experiences
on language has limited effectiveness. See id. at 93-94 (concluding legal reform
needs to incorporate influence of culture).
118. See SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ: A REPORT FOR THE JOINT SERVICE COMMIT-
TEE ON MILITARYJUSTICE 1 (2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/php/
docs/subcommittee reportMarkHarveyl-13-05.doc (explaining background and
approach to recommending changes). The committee reviewed sex offense provi-
sions of the federal statutes, all the state statutes, and the Model Penal Code. See
id. (describing review). The report presented six options for revising the UCMJ,
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V. PROPOSALS FOR ENDING MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT BY CHANGING
THE CULTURE
Military policies and leaders' actions that subordinate military women
reinforce the problematic aspects of the culture that contribute to sexual
assault.1 19 Therefore, this Comment proposes that the military should fo-
cus on reforms that can help change the culture, such as moving military
women beyond their mere "token" status through recruiting, retention,
and promotion efforts. 120 Also, the United States government should
abolish the exclusion on women from combat in order to end the official
subordination of military women. 121 Finally, the military needs to recog-
nize male victims of sexual assault by holding commanders who do not
support the prevention and response program accountable. 122
but concluded that change was not necessary. See id. at 1, 3-4 (stating committee
conclusions and summarizing various options). Commentators have identified
"Option 5" of this report as the basis for the Article 120 revisions ultimately en-
acted. See Johnson, supra note 67, at 27 (noting Congress employed Option 5
recommendations).
119. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 346-48 (asserting that military policies main-
tain subordination of military women and foster harassment and violence); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES 8-10 (2005), [hereinafter SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE], available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtfs/docrecd/
HighGPORRC-tx.pdf (identifying factors that influence military service acad-
emy culture and impact sexual harassment and assault). The task force found that
the devaluation of military women has a significant impact on the military service
academies' cultures. See id. at 8-9 (describing lack of understanding about wo-
men's integration into military). The culture of the service academies has a "sig-
nificant impact on sexual harassment and assault." Id. at 8 (linking culture to
sexual violence).
120. See Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals
and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REv. 305, 327-29 (1998) (proposing that increasing
military women's representation may change military culture). Tokenism theory
"posits that changing the demographics of a group may be the surest way to
change the culture, and ultimately the behavior of the majority in the group." Id.
at 328 (explaining tokenism theory).
121. See Blythe Leszkay, Feminism on the Front Lines, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
133, 138 (2003) (arguing women's combat exclusion shapes military members'
perceptions of military women as inferior).
122. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 13-16 (finding lack of program sup-
port by some commanders); Chamallas, supra note 120, at 372-73 (contending that
sexual abuse of military men is kept invisible). If the military culture acknowl-
edged that military men are victims of sexual abuse such acknowledgement may
improve the situation for military women. See id. at 373 (describing recognition of
sexual abuse of men as potentially "liberating for women"). "When rape and sex-
ual harassment are degendered, in the sense that we acknowledge that men may
also be victims .. . some of the major objections to women's presence in the mili-
tary may lose their force." Id.
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A. Giving Validity to Women's Military Service and Enabling Military Women
to Change the Culture
Women still comprise only about fourteen percent of the armed
forces, which leads sociologists and legal scholars to label their presence in
the military as token.123 This minority status hampers women's ability to
influence the military culture.124 Thus, altering the demographics of the
military, by increasing the number of women in the armed forces, may be
the most effective way of changing the military culture. 12 5 Just as Presi-
dent Truman successfully ordered the racial integration of the military,
the President should use the commander-in-chief authority to fully inte-
grate women in the military. 1 26 Specifically, the President could give valid-
ity to women's military service by directing the DoD to reevaluate
recruitment, retention, and assignment policies affecting women.' 27
Research has shown women's token presence in the military needs to
change to transform the culture and end sexual assault.' 2 8 The DoD Task
Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Acade-
mies found that some members do not value women as highly as men
because "women are a minority, are excluded from some of the highly
regarded combat specialties, and are held to different physical fitness stan-
dards."' 29 The Task Force recommended increasing the number of wo-
123. See WOMEN REs. & EDUC. INST., ACTIVE DuTy SERVICE PERSONNEL BY
BRANCH OF SERVICE (2007), http://wrei.org/Sept.2007 -Active.pdf (providing sta-
tistics on number of women in military); Chamallas, supra note 120, at 324 (assert-
ing military women's presence is token). "In the sociological literature 'tokenism'
is used to describe the situation of a group that is dramatically under-represented
in a given organizational setting." Id. As of September 2007, women comprised
about 15.1% of officers and 14.2% of enlisted members. See WOMEN REs. & EDUC.
INST., supra (same). Women made up 13.7% of the Army, 14.7% of the Navy, 6.3%
of the Marine Corps, and 19.6% of the Air Force. See id. (providing branch specific
statistics).
124. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 324 (describing limited ability of tokens
to influence organizational culture).
125. See id. at 328 (arguing that changing group demographics by increasing
numbers of women and placing more women in leadership and supervisory roles
could change military culture).
126. See Karst, supra note 85, at 520 ("In 1948 President Harry Truman, facing
an uphill fight for re-election, issued two executive orders requiring 'equality of
treatment and opportunity' in the federal civil service and in the armed services.").
127. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 327-29 (explaining how increasing mili-
tary women beyond tokens may change military culture).
128. See SExUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE, supra note 119, at ES-1, 9 (find-
ing that service academy culture contributes to sexual harassment and assault and
citing women's minority status as relevant factor); BENEDICT, supfa note 3, at 225-26
(arguing that promoting more military women and distributing women evenly
within units will help change military culture and end sexual violence); Chamallas,
supra note 120, at 328-29 (explaining that tokenism theory proposes that changing
group demographics can alter group culture and behavior).
129. SEXuAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE, supra note 119, at ES-1 (asserting
that status of military women contributes to conduciveness of culture to sexual
harassment and violence).
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COMMENT
men in key leadership positions and the percentage of women at the
service academies to counteract such devaluation.13 0 Similarly, sex-inte-
gration in the workplace has shown that when present in substantial num-
bers, women are viewed as peers and leaders, and the gender line becomes
less important.1 3' Studies indicate that women can influence cultural
change within an organization when they comprise about twenty-five per-
cent of organization members.' 3 2 Thus, the DoD should focus on recruit-
ing and retaining more women to increase the percentage of military
women-currently fourteen percent-to at least twenty-five percent.13 3 In
addition, if more military women were promoted to leadership positions,
women would have the ability to directly influence the military culture by
addressing misogynistic social practices. 134
Many non-military courts have recognized the impact of tokenism on
the work environment and the negative behaviors that result.1 35 The
United States Supreme Court "acknowledged the link between tokenism
and the prevalence of stereotyping" in a case where the only woman candi-
date was denied partnership in a large accounting firm.1 3 6 In another
case involving a "hyper-masculine working environment," a district court
130. See id. (recommending changes to improve status of military women at
service academies).
131. See Karst, supra note 85, at 538-40 (explaining positive change results
when number of women in male-dominated workplaces increases). For example,
although police forces initially resisted integrating women, female officers' status
among male officers has improved and female officers are viewed as respected
peers. See id. at 539-40 (describing changes in attitudes after sex-integration).
132. See id. at 538 n.154 (citing studies on critical mass in social groups).
133. See WOMEN REs. & EDUC. INST., supra note 123 (providing statistics on
number of military women); Martha Chamallas, Women and War: A Critical Dis-
course: Panel Two-Women Warriors, 20 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JusT. 338, 340-41
(2005) (arguing for increased numbers of military women).
134. See BENEDicr, supra note 3, at 225 ("As the number of women in author-
ity increases, they will be less isolated and threatened, and more able to become
positive role models and to prevent abuse."); Chamallas, supra note 120, at 328-29
(arguing women in military leadership positions can help prevent gender bias and
allow women to serve as role models for subordinates).
135. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 325 (describing gender discrimination
cases recognizing tokenism); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
255-56 (1989) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m) (1991) as recognized in De-
sert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (approving of expert testimony on sex
stereotyping in workplaces with few women); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (recognizing expert testimony that
linked rarity to workplace stereotyping).
136. Chamallas, supra note 120, at 325 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228).
The woman who was denied a partnership was described by the firm's partners as
aggressive and macho, and some partners told her to take "a course at charm
school" and make her appearance more feminine. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
233, 235 (describing partners' reactions towards plaintiff). The Court recognized
the utility of expert witness testimony that the plaintiffs token status as the only
woman in the pool of candidates contributed to the discrimination against her. See
id. at 236, 255-56 (summarizing expert testimony and accepting use of that
testimony).
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similarly recognized the connection between tokenism and the presence
of stereotyping as combining to create a sexually hostile work environ-
ment.1 37 Thus, tokenism is a viable theory in this context, and if the DoD
is committed to reducing the military's sexual assault problem, the DoD
needs to counteract the harmful effects of women's minority status in the
military by enlisting and retaining more women and encouraging their
promotion to positions of leadership.1 38 Simply increasing the overall
number of women is not enough, however; the military services also must
make specific efforts to ensure women are evenly distributed among mili-
tary units so that their presence is significant enough to impact the
culture.' 3 9
B. Empowering Military Women to Defend the Nation
After World War II, Congress permitted women to be permanent
members of the armed forces, but, importantly, military regulations at that
time specifically excluded women from combat.140 Gradually, Congress
repealed portions of the exclusion policy and permitted military women to
fly combat aircraft and to serve on navy ships exposed to combat. 14 1 This
piecemeal reduction of the exclusion policy culminated in 1994, when
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued a memorandum establishing the
current combat exclusion for military women. 142 The memorandum
137. Chamallas, supra note 120, at 325 (citing Robinson, 760 F. Supp. 1486).
The expert witness in Robinson identified rarity of women workers in the shipyard,
which occurs when a group is underrepresented as compared to another group, as
a factor that increases the prevalence of harmful sexual stereotyping. See Robinson,
760 F. Supp. at 1503 (explaining rarity in workforces).
138. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 328-29 (proposing efforts to overcome
tokenism of military women).
139. See id. at 327 (describing need to distribute military women carefully).
"Even when the overall representation of women in a large organization increases,
it may have little effect on the personal interactions of the workers if the women
are so dispersed that their presence has little chance to affect the culture of the
working group." Id.
140. See Leszkay, supra note 121, at 137 (describing history of women's mili-
tary service). Military regulations prohibited women from serving in combat and
limited the command positions women could assume. See Linda K. Kerber, "A
Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . .. Ladies": Women, Civic Obligation and Military
Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 111-12 (explaining limitations on
military women's service).
141. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993) (repealing statutory restrictions on assignment of
military women in Navy and Marine Corps); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991) (repeal-
ing statutory limits on assignment of military women to combat aircraft). See gener-
ally Krystyna M. Cloutier, Note, Marching Toward War: Reconnoitering the Use of All
Female Platoons, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1531, 1543-50 (2008) (providing background of
modern combat exclusion policy).
142. See MARGARET C. HARRELL ET AL., ASSESSING THE ASSIGNMENT POLICY FOR
ARMY WOMEN xi-xii (2007), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2007/RANDMG590-1.pdf (describing current combat exclusion policy).
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stated that personnel could "be assigned to all positions for which they are
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units
below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct com-
bat on the ground . . . . This combat exclusion prevents women from
serving in approximately twenty percent of military positions.1 44
Notably, in upholding the male-only draft registration in Rostker v.
Goldberg, the United States Supreme Court determined that the purpose of
the registration was to prepare for a future draft of combat troops. 145 Ac-
cording to Congress, and as recognized by the Rostker Court, requiring
women to register for military service would necessitate changing the com-
bat exclusion policy, which Congress was not inclined to do.' 4 6 Though
not ruling on the constitutionality of the combat exclusion, the Court
stressed the deference due to Congress and the President in forming and
prescribing rules for the military.147 Nevertheless, as many legal scholars
have noted-and as the Court has acknowledged-the government must
143. See id. at 72 (providing Secretary Aspin's assignment memorandum).
The memorandum defined direct combat on the ground:
Direct ground combat is engaging the enemy on the ground with individ-
ual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a
high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's person-
nel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield
while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneu-
ver, or shock effect.
Id. at 72-73.
144. See MARGARET C. HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
MILITARY WOMEN: EFFEcTs UPON READINESS, COHESION, AND MORALE 12 tbl.2.1
(1997), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR896/
(providing statistics on military positions open to women). The percent of posi-
tions open to women are: 67.2% of Army positions, 91.2% of Navy positions, 62%
of Marine Corps positions, and 99.4% of Air Force positions. See id. (listing statis-
tics for each service).
145. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) (upholding male-only
draft registration as substantially related to government purpose of preparing for
supply of combat troops). "Legal feminists disagreed strongly with the reasoning
of Rostker, particularly the idea that one sex-based form of discrimination (in
Rostker, women's exclusion from combat) could be used to justify another (wo-
men's exclusion from draft registration)." Mazur, supra note 50, at 53. The Court
repeated this reasoning in Schlesinger v. Ballard by upholding a statutory promotion
scheme that allowed female Navy officers more time for promotion before auto-
matic discharge than male officers. See 419 U.S. 498, 505-06, 508 (1975) (describ-
ing differential treatment). The Court concluded that Congress may have
rationally believed that women naval officers were disadvantaged in competing for
promotion because of the combat exclusion, thus the differential treatment was
constitutional. See id. at 506, 510 (finding no constitutional violation).
146. See Rostker 453 U.S. at 77-78 (identifying combat exclusion as Congress's
reason for not including women in draft registration).
147. See id. at 70-71 (describing constitutional authority of legislative and ex-
ecutive branches to determine military composition and rules). Two reasons gen-
erally cited for the substantial deference given to the government in constitutional
challenges to military regulations are: (1) the constitutional responsibility for ad-
ministration of the military that is placed on the legislative and executive branches
and (2) the view of the military as a separate community because of its unique
mission. See John A. Carr, The Difference Between Can and Should: Able v. United
2010] COMMENrT 501
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ensure that military policies serve legitimate ends as opposed to "archaic
and stereotypic notions" about men and women.148
Because women are still excluded from direct ground combat, mili-
tary women do not serve on an equal basis with military men.1 49 Such
restrictions on access to combat positions serve the purpose of maintain-
ing the gender line and preserving the military's masculinity.150 That is,
the exclusion of women from combat allows the military to "control when,
where, and how women are allowed to fight," thereby reinforcing the view
that military women are lesser, second-class military members.' 51
In addition, the combat exclusion policy precludes women from gain-
ing the requisite combat experience essential to achieving promotion to
positions of senior leadership.1 52 Furthermore, "being told that they are
unfit for combat training, that they need protection, women are more
readily victims of violence of every kind."' Opponents to women serving
in combat typically argue that women are physically incapable of such en-
gagement, will disrupt unit cohesion, and must be protected from capture
States and the Continuing Debate About Homosexual Conduct in the Military, 46 A.F. L.
REv. 1, 29-30, n.164 (1999) (detailing substantial deference rationale).
148. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 307 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)) (describing courts' level of scrutiny in sex-based
classifications cases).
149. See Leszkay, supra note 121, at 137 ("Army policy ... still prevents women
from serving in positions that involve 'direct combat."'); see also Lizette Alvarez,
G.I. Jane Stealthily Breaks the Combat Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at Al (noting
that military "[w] omen can lead some male troops into combat as officers, but they
cannot serve with them in battle").
150. See Karst, supra note 85, at 537 ("The combat exclusion's main purpose is
to express the gender line.").
151. See Leszkay, supra note 121, at 138 (contending that combat exclusion
policy influences military members' view of military women). Leszkay asserts that
the combat designation given to certain military jobs is not based on empirical
data about women's capabilities. See id. (discussing combat exclusion policy).
Rather, the designation reflects "what the military or Congress determines wo-
men's proper military role to be at any particular moment." Id. (asserting that
combat exclusion serves gender-based purposes).
152. See Karst, supra note 85, at 524 (contending that exclusion of women
from combat prevents command experience needed). Not only does the combat
exclusion hurt military women's advancement opportunities, the exclusion policy
is also significant because of the socialization that the military provides service
members. See id. at 527-28 (describing educational impact of military services on
members). "Every day the services teach their members, women and men, young
and old, that women do not speak with authority about the subject that is the
center of the services' missions." Id. at 528.
153. Kerber, supra note 140, at 121 (quoting Selective Service Registration: Hear-
ing Before the Task Force on Def and Int'l Affairs of the H. Comm. on the Budget, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1980) (statement ofJudy Goldsmith, Nat'l Org. of Women)).
Goldsmith opined that women are more susceptible to violence because the com-
bat exclusion prevents them from receiving self-defense training and the confi-
dence that such training brings. See id. (describing negative effects of combat
exclusion).
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and rape by the enemy.15 4 Nonetheless, military women, possibly in cir-
cumvention of the combat exclusion policy, are presently engaging the
enemy in Iraq. 155 These military women are repeatedly proving that they
are capable of serving in combat.156
Military readiness is the common denominator between the issues of
sexual assault and women in combat.1 5 7 Sexual assault damages military
readiness because victims are psychologically and physically harmed and
154. See id. at 160, 164-65, 167-68 (describing typical arguments against al-
lowing women to serve in combat); see also Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed
Military, 14 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 815, 835-36 (2007) (citing physical strength
of women, readiness, and unit cohesion as justified reasons for excluding women
from combat). Some proponents of the combat exclusion cite physical and psy-
chological requirements, unit cohesion, prohibitive costs of modifying equipment
and facilities, and the need to protect women from the risk of being captured,
injured, or killed. See Pamela R. Jones, Note, Women in the Crossfire: Should the Court
Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 252, 261-69 (1993) (summarizing exclusionist argu-
ments and responses of opponents); see alsoJames D. Milko, Comment, Beyond the
Persian Gulf Crisis: Expanding the Role of Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41
Am. U. L. REv. 1301, 1314-25 (1992) (analyzing arguments about combat exclusion
as applied to Gulf War experiences).
155. See HARRELu, supra note 142, at 63-65 (describing possible non-compli-
ance with Army assignment policies). The Army definition of direct combat in-
cludes "repelling the enemy's assault by fire." Id. at 65 n.2 (quoting Army
regulation). Army women are assigned to units with a routine mission of self-de-
fense. See id. at 64 (describing Army assignments). "If such missions are included
in the definition of repelling the enemy's assault and thereby interpreted as a routine
direct combat mission, then the Army is out of compliance with its assignment
policy." Id. Notably, Army members indicated that the Army's assignment policy
for women based on the combat exclusion "did not reflect the environment in
Iraq" and described it as "obsolete" and "archaic." Id. at 49 (summarizing re-
sponses). The study found service members "widely accepted that female service
members were necessary to Army operations in Iraq." Id. at 51 (noting members'
perceptions of need for military women).
156. See Alvarez, supra note 149, at Al (describing deployed military women
engaging in combat and quoting military leaders stating women are as capable as
men in combat). Some commanders have resorted to "bureaucratic trickery" by
complying with assignment policies on paper, but then utilizing military women in
capacities where women have "patrolled streets with machine guns, served as gun-
ners on vehicles, disposed of explosives, and driven trucks down bomb-ridden
roads." See id. (noting accomplishments of deployed military women). "[A]s of
2006, more than 2,000 women who fought in Iraq or Afghanistan had been
awarded Bronze Stars, several for bravery and valor in combat, and more than
1,300 had earned the Combat Action Badge." BENEDICr, supra note 3, at 224 (as-
serting that military women are succeeding in combat).
157. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that sexual assault damages
military readiness); Karst, supra note 85, at 535 (contending that combat exclusion
impedes military readiness). The combat exclusion prevents building the most
effective fighting force because not all men are stronger than all women and some
combat positions, such as a tanker, are more easily filled by smaller soldiers. See
Leszkay, supra note 121, at 160-61 (asserting that "emphasizing sheer physical
strength and size to the exclusion of everything else . . . may actually reduce com-
bat effectiveness").
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the victims' units are disrupted.1 58 Likewise, the exclusion of women from
combat deprives the military of its ability to utilize the most qualified
members to accomplish the mission.' 5 9 Therefore, the United States gov-
ernment should end the combat exclusion and allow military women to
fulfill their sworn duty to support and defend the Constitution.1 6 0
C. Ending the Plight of Male Victims of Military Sexual Assault
Military women are not the only military members in danger of sexual
assault-military men are also victims of sexual assault by other male and
female service members.16 1 Yet, some commanders of all-male units have
resisted attempts to implement the DoD's sexual assault prevention and
response program under the belief that the program is not relevant or
that sexual assault is not a problem in all-male units.16 2 By obstructing
implementation, these commanders prevent the program from changing
military culture because the service members in those units do not learn
that males are also victims and that ending sexual assault is a DoD
priority. 163
The fact that male-on-male sexual assault occurs in the military, where
heterosexuality is assumed and indeed enforced, shows that the problem is
not due to the services' sex-integration.164 Rather, such assaults by men
who consider themselves heterosexual demonstrate that sexual assault is in
fact an act of domination.1 65 The DoD must recognize that military men
are also victims of sexual assault and such crimes occur even when women
158. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (describing impact of sexual assault
on victim).
159. See Leszkay, supra note 121, at 161 (arguing that women's combat exclu-
sion hinders military capabilities). The combat exclusion "limits the discretion of
military professionals in selecting service members to perform jobs for which they
are qualified." Karst, supra note 85, at 535 (proposing that capabilities should de-
termine qualification for combat positions).
160. See 10 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (containing oath taken upon enlistment into
armed forces); Leszkay, supra note 121, at 169-70 (arguing that women must serve
in combat to become equal citizens).
161. See FY08 REPORT, supra note 4, at app. c, tbl.2 (providing statistics for
military sexual assault by victim and assailant gender). For statistics on male vic-
tims of military sexual assault, see supra note 5.
162. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 15 (describing lack of program sup-
port). For instance, an official at one military installation reported that some com-
manders of all-male units have not permitted her to provide the required sexual
assault prevention and response training. See id. (describing resistance to program
execution).
163. See id. ("Commanders who do not emphasize and prioritize sexual as-
sault prevention and response programs-including those in all-male units-or
who do not understand the policies and procedures effectively limit service mem-
bers' knowledge about the program and ability to exercise their reporting
options.").
164. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 372-73 (proposing that recognition of
sexual abuse of male victims by other males not based on sexual orientation may
improve military women's situation).
165. See id. at 372 (describing same-sex rapes of men as "power rapes").
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are not present. 166 By doing so, the DoD can help service members un-
derstand that military sexual assault is rooted in the current military cul-
ture that subordinates those seen as feminine or weak and accepts sexual
violence as normal.167
The DoD can recognize male victims of sexual assault and change the
military culture by holding commanders accountable for implementing
and supporting the prevention and response program.1 68 The military is
effective in changing behavior in other contexts because it uses a strict
chain of command; thus, commanders can play a vital role in shaping the
military culture.16 9 Therefore, the DoD should direct the services to pun-
ish any commander who impedes the efforts of program officials or inter-
feres with a service member's attempt to utilize the restricted reporting
option.170
VI. CONCLUSION
The appalling statistics of military sexual assault show that the United
States must re-launch its efforts to prevent sexual assaults within the mili-
tary.171 The current approach, which is focused on victim response, pre-
ventative education, and statutory reform, cannot target the root cause of
the problem-the contemporary United States military culture.' 7 2 The
goal advocated in this Comment is not to eliminate the military culture;
rather, the aim of this proposed reform is to make the culture serve legiti-
mate ends as opposed to reinforcing sexual violence.173
The United States government should address military policies and
leaders' actions that subordinate military women and reinforce the hyper-
masculine, misogynistic aspects of the culture that contribute to sexual as-
166. See id. at 373 ("[O]nce we understand that sexual abuse is a problem in
male-only, as well as integrated environments, we might stop trying to solve the
problem of sexual abuse by excluding women.").
167. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 346-48 (asserting that subordination of wo-
men by military culture fosters sexual harassment and violence).
168. Cf Benedict, supra note 4, at 45 (proposing that commanders and of-
ficers can help transform military culture).
169. See id. ("[S]tudies have shown that commanders who ban pornography,
treat their female soldiers with respect and insist that others do likewise signifi-
cantly reduce sexual persecution."); see also Mazur, supra note 48, at 469 (describ-
ing role of military chain of command in shaping members' behavior).
170. See BENEDICT, supra note 3, at 227 (recommending improved officer ac-
countability and training).
171. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 45 (contending that current efforts are
insufficient).
172. See id. ("[A]ll the well-meaning reforms, meetings, and rules issued in
Washington D.C., will never have much effect as long as military culture remains
unchanged.").
173. See BURKE, supra note 84, at 21-22 (contending certain aspects of military
culture conflict with its mission). "Military culture is made, not born; it has a his-
tory; its future should be directed toward serving democratically approved ends."
Id. at 22.
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sault.174 Changing the military's culture to reduce the occurrence of sex-
ual assault will likely require a combination of executive, legislative, and
administrative action.1 7 5 Therefore, this Comment proposes that the Pres-
ident require the DoD to reevaluate its recruitment, retention, and assign-
ment policies to move the status of military women beyond that of mere
tokens.17 6
Moreover, Congress can remedy the official subordination of women
by eliminating the combat exclusion policy-a policy which truly serves no
purpose other than maintaining the gender line.177 In so doing, the
United States government should recognize the contributions military wo-
men have already made in the War on Terror.1 7 8 Finally, the DoD needs
to recognize male victims of sexual assault by using the military justice
system to hold commanders responsible for failing to support the sexual
assault prevention and response program.17 9 Collectively, these proposed
reforms will enable the United States to effectively combat the source of
military sexual assault-the destructive aspects of the military culture-
174. See Vojdik, supra note 16, at 346-48 (asserting military policies maintain
subordination of military women and foster harassment and violence).
175. See Abrams, supra note 16, at 240 (describing obstacles to changing mili-
tary culture). Historically, courts have displayed deference to military expertise in
areas involving traditionally military concerns; however, it is difficult to distinguish
between opinions of military leaders that reflect experience and opinions that are
simply judgments based on the homogenous attitudes of an insulated group. See
id. at 225 (describing courts' deference). See Michael J. Frevola, Damn the Torpe-
does, Full Speed Ahead: The Argument for Total Sex Integration in the Armed Services, 28
CONN. L. REv. 621, 658-62 (1996) (describing rationale for judicial deference to
military decisions). See generally Leszkay, supra note 121, at 154-57 (describing ra-
tionale for courts' deference on military policies). With the support of the public,
elected bodies (Congress and the President) can change the military culture
through executive orders or congressional hearings and legislation. See Abrams,
supra, at 238 (proposing mechanisms for change).
176. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 327-29 (explaining how increasing mili-
tary women beyond "tokens" may change military culture).
177. See Karst, supra note 85, at 577 (describing attempt by DoD in 1979 to
end combat exclusion). In 1982, Major General Jeanne Holm noted that "[i]f all
women were discharged tomorrow, most of the distinctions [between combat and
noncombat jobs] would be abandoned the day after." See Leszkay, supra note 121,
at 138 (quoting JEANNE Hou, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLU-
TION 395 (1982)).
178. See Leszkay, supra note 121, at 138 (arguing women's combat exclusion
shapes military members' perceptions of military women as inferior).
179. See Chamallas, supra note 120, at 372-73 (contending that sexual abuse of
military men is kept invisible).
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and allow all military members to focus on the mission of supporting and
defending this country. 18 0
Megan N. Schmid, Captain, United States Air Force18 1
180. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 45 (recommending that transformation of
military culture begin with commanders and officers); Chamallas, supra note 120,
at 327-29 (proposing that increasing numbers of military women overall and plac-
ing more women in leadership positions may change military culture); Vojdik,
supra note 16, at 348 (contending that combat exclusion perpetuates sexual vio-
lence against military women).
181. The views expressed in this Comment are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of
Defense, or the United States government.
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